Estate Tax - Buy-Sell Agreements by Brandon, Merwin M., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 21 | Number 4
June 1961
Estate Tax - Buy-Sell Agreements
Merwin M. Brandon Jr.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Merwin M. Brandon Jr., Estate Tax - Buy-Sell Agreements, 21 La. L. Rev. (1961)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol21/iss4/15
NOTES
is attacked by a candidate seeking to have himself adjudged
winner of an election, it is likely that courts will require exacting
proof of injury to the plaintiff before granting the remedy
sought. If the contest seeks to protect the public's right to an
election which represents the free will of the majority and the
remedy sought is that of annulling the election, the court will
probably continue to require less exacting proof of secrecy vio-
lations in order to sustain a judgment annulling the election.
Thus the public has a right to a secret election, but plaintiff does
not have a right to be declared winner of an election because his
opponent received more non-secret votes than plaintiff received.
Sydney B. Nelson
ESTATE TAX - BuY-SELL AGREEMENTS
A family partnership agreement provided that upon the with-
drawal of any partner the remaining partners had the option to
purchase his interest at two-thirds of "net value."' Failure to
exercise this option within twelve months automatically dis-
solved the partnership. The agreement also provided that upon
the death of a partner, the remaining partners had the option
to purchase the interest of the decedent for its full "net value."
Following the death of two partners, estate tax returns were
filed. The partnership interest of each was included in the re-
spective estates at two-thirds of its "net value." The Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency, basing his valuation upon the full
value of each partner's interest in the total net assets of the firm.
The deficiency was paid. On suit for a refund, held, allowed.
The value of the interest for estate tax purposes cannot exceed
the value of those interests during the lifetime of the deceased
partners. Land v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Ala.
1960) .2
may determine that a more appropriate remedy may be punishment of those who
violated the law rather than annulling the election. Support for the remedy of
punishing violators is found in the numerous statutes which provide penalties for
violation of election laws, some of which are the following: LA. R.S. 18:73, 94,
131, 222, 223, 341, 352, 363, 367, 368, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378,
379, 380, 560, 562, 563, 565, 566, 570, 587, 588, 589, 634, 733, 735, 736, 737, 738,
1079, 1111, 1194, 1484, 1486 (1950).
1. Land v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Ala. 1960) (the net value
of a partnership interest was to be determined by valuing the assets of the part-
nership either by agreement among the partners, in accordance with accepted
accounting procedures, or, if necessary, through arbitration).
2. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, CCH U.S.T.C. "Court of Appeals Dockets,"
May 5, 1961.
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Owners of a closely held business may attempt to prepare for
the problems which arise upon the withdrawal or death of a par-
ticipant in the venture by entering into agreements with one
another concerning the disposition of the business interest. The
many different types of agreements employed to achieve these
ends are loosely referred to as "buy and sell agreements." S The
agreement may require a sale in the event of the death of a par-
ticipant by binding his estate to sell his interest and by obligat-
ing the survivors to purchase it. It may provide only that the
survivors have an option to purchase the interest owned by a
participant who withdraws or dies. Or the agreement may mere-
ly give the remaining participants a "first refusal" by denying
to any withdrawing participant the right to sell his interest to
an outsider without first offering it to the other participants.
When the valuation of the interest in these agreements is lower
than the "fair market value, ' 4 taxpayers urge that the agree-
ment fixes the value of the business interest for estate tax pur-
poses. If the agreement restricts transfer of the business inter-
est during life and upon death, the position of the Internal Reve-
nue Service is that the valuation is fixed for estate tax purposes
by the agreement. 5 However, if the agreement restricts transfer
of the business interest only upon death of a participant, the In-
3. See, e.g., Brown, Hov; To Plan and Draft a Stock Purchase Agreement, in
EIGHTH TAX INSTITUTE 519 (University of Southern California 1956) ; Fried-
man, Buy and Sell Agreements, in FIFTEENTH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
1053 (New York University 1957) ; Riehm, Buy-Sell Agreements, in FOURTH AN-
NUAL PROCEEDINGS, TEXAS INSTITUTES 49 (1956) ; LOWDNES & KRAMER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES c. 20, § 46 (1956) ; WILLIS, HANDBOOK OF PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION (1957) ; O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Cor-
porations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773 (1952). For an enlight-
ening article on the buy-sell agreement in Louisiana, dealing with some areas of
possible difficulty, see Cahn, Buy and Sell Agreements in Louisiana, 8 LA. B.J.
26 (May 1960).
4. IRC Regulation 20.2031-1(b) : "The value of every item of property includ-
ible in a decedent's gross estate under sections 2031 through 2044 is its fair market
value . . . the price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller."
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1961 Regulations 20.2031-2(h) provides in part:
"Little weight will be accorded a price contained in an option or contract under
which the decedent is free to dispose of the underlying securities at any price he
chooses during his lifetime." See also Rev. Rul. 59-60 § 8 (IRB 1959-9, p. 15);
IRB 1953-2 Ruling 157, p. 255. The courts apparently feel that the restriction
during lifetime on the alienation of a business interest is necessary if that figure
is to be used for fixing value. Broderick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955) ;
May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Bensel v. CIR, 100 F.2d 639
(3d Cir. 1938). Cf. Worcester County Trust Co. v. CIR, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir.
1943) ; Estate of Fiorito, 33 T.C. 440(A) (1959); Estate of Littick, 31 T.C.
181(A) (1958) Estate of Weil, 22 T.C. 1267(A) (1954) ; Estate of Salt, 17
T.C. 92 (1951); Estate of Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944). But see City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., Executor, 23 B.T.A. 663 (1931) ; Estate of Trammell, 18 T.C.
662 (1952).
NOTES
ternal Revenue Service position is that it does not fix the value
of the business interest.6
The partnership agreement involved in the instant case
bound the partners while living and their estates after death,
thus meeting the conditions required by the Internal Revenue
Service in order to have the valuation of the business interest
involved fixed by the agreement.7 It was unusual, however, in
that it permitted the purchase of the interest of a living partner
at one-third less than the amount required to be paid his estate
if the interest were purchased after his death.8 The court was
called upon to fix the time at which the interest was valued. In
so doing, although the estates involved actually received the full
net value of the interest, the court set the valuation of the inter-
est at two-thirds of the net value attributable to that interest -
the amount which could have been received during the lifetime
of a partner. This was done on the theory that the value of the
interest of the deceased for estate tax purposes should not exceed
the value of that interest which the decedent could have received
during life.
A situation somewhat analogous to the instant case was pre-
sented in Goodman v. Granger,9 where the decedent's widow re-
ceived monthly payments from her husband's employer under a
deferred compensation contract. The court there stated that the
right to the payments was to be valued at the time when that
right vested in the widow and became absolute, even though the
decedent's right to deferred compensation was contingent upon
several conditions so long as the decedent was living. In the in-
stant case, however, the court would seem to be according the
amount actually paid to a decedent's estate for a business inter-
est less importance in fixing value than the amount for which
he could have sold his interest during his lifetime. 10 Regardless
6. See note 5 supra.
7. The regulations require that the agreement must be valid and executed at
arm's length and must be supported by a full and adequate consideration. The
court has recognized that mutual promises constitute full and adequate considera-
tion. Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Davis v. United States, 60-1
U.S.T.C. para. 11943, p. 8560 (U.S. D.C. Utah 1960) ; Estate of Fiorito, 33 T.C.
440 (A) (1959).
8. Land v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 521, 523-24 (S.D. Ala. 1960).
9. 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957).
10. 187 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D. Ala. 1960). The opinion did not consider the
possible argument that the decedent provided his estate with a right to receive a
greater amount than he could have received and that this right was transferred
in contemplation of death. See Broderick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955),
where the Commissioner attempted to claim that the difference in the open market
value and the book price stipulated in the agreement was a gift, a transfer in
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of the correctness of the holding in the instant case, the use of
the device approved by the court appears to offer a wide avenue
for avoiding estate taxes.
Merwin M. Brandon, Jr.
INCOME TAX - GAIN FROM A STOCK FOR STOCK PLUS BOOT
TRANSACTION
Taxpayer, sole stockholder of International Dairy Supply
Company, transferred his stock in that company to Foremost
Dairies, Inc., for 82,375 shares of the common stock of Foremost
and $3,000,000.00 cash. He reported a capital gain on the trans-
action limited to the cash less certain expenses. The Commis-
sioner determined that the entire gain, $4,163,691.94, was recog-
nizable at the time of the transaction and assessed taxpayer for
the deficiency. The Tax Court held that the recognizable gain
on the transaction was to be limited to the cash received.1 On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
held, reversed. An exchange in which cash plus voting stock is
received is not a reorganization.2 The entire amount of the gain
is recognizable at the time of the transaction. Commissioner v.
Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1960).
Generally, gains on sales or exchanges are recognizable to the
full amount of the gain at the time of the transaction.3 How-
ever, it was early recognized that it would be desirable to delay
recognition of gain so that business readjustments could be made
without tax consequences in cases where the stockholders in the
enterprise are retaining their interests without the receipt of
cash and the essential continuity of business is being preserved. 4
contemplation of death. While the court did not accede to this point, it should be
noted that the agreement involved in the Gore case provided for the estate to re-
ceive the same amount which the decedent would have received had he sold out
during his lifetime. That fact might well make the reasoning of the Gore case in-
applicable in situations similar to the Land case, where the agreement provides for
a change in the value of the business interest when the partner's estate, rather
than the partner, is the vendor.
1. Grover D. Turnbow, 32 T.C. 646 (1959).
2. The only reorganization definition that could be applicable would be Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1) (B), now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §368(a) (1)
(B). See note 11 infra.
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112 (a), 53 Stat. 37, now INT. REV. CODE Or
1954, § 1002.
4. Letter from Secretary of Treasury, 78 Cong. Rec. 2512 (1934). See, gen-
erally, SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861
(1938).
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